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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs

Case No. 14517

WILLIAM w'. MORRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover on a personal guaranty
executed by the Appellant, William E. Morris, in favor of
Packaging Corporation of America, Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable Stewart
M..Hanson, Sr. presiding.

Plaintiff-Respondent was awarded

judgment against the Defendant-Appellant in the sum of $20,000.00
together with court costs of $28.00 and attorney's fees of
32,000.00.

From that adverse judgment the Defendant-Appellant

has appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
District Court affirmed in its entirety.

-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Packaging Corporation of America is a corporation
which operates two plants in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 92, 1. 27-30).
Respondent had for many years supplied packaging material for
Bakkerfs Royal Dutch Cookies located in Draper, Utah.

Bakkerfs

Royal Dutch Cookies became financially depressed and a court
appointed receiver took over their assets and the operation of the
business.

Hawkeye Investment, by and through one of its largest

stockholders, William Morris, (R. 138, 1. 9 and R. 164, 1. 10-11)
made an application to the court appointed receiver in the State of
Utah for the purchase of the assets of Bakker's Royal Dutch Cookies
(R. 91, 1. 19-25).

Hawkeye Investment thereafter contacted

Respondent in an attempt to establish a line of credit so it
could continue to purchase cookie cartons for its products.

The

business was new and it was not financially able to pay for the
products, so Respondent required that all shipments be shipped
C.O.D. (R. 128, 1. 3 ) .
Appellant further informed Al Ellison, credit manager of
Respondent, that he would be in Utah and would "oversee the
operation and get reports from the local people on how things
were progressing" (R. 145, 1. 23) .
Appellant William Morris and one William Birkinshaw, the
president of Hawkeye Investment, approached the credit manager
of Respondent in an attempt to establish an open account with

-3Respondent (R. 167, 1. 2-8).

It was agreed between the parties

that credit would be extended to Hawkeye Investment if Mr. Morris
and Mr. Birkinshaw would personally sign a guaranty in the sum of
$10/000.00.

This was done and the credit was then extended

(R. 66, 1. 23-28).
Within a short period of time it became apparent to the
persons who were operating the cookie factory in Draper and the
agents and employees of Respondent that a $10,000.00 guaranty was
not sufficient (R. 95). Thereafter respondent, by and through
James Remley, area credit manager, contacted Mr. Morris to see
if he would be willing to execute a new personal guaranty in the
sum of $20,000.00 (R. 99 and R. 110, 1. 3-13).

After some

discussion Appellant agreed to execute a guaranty and it was
forwarded by Mr. Remley to the Appellant, who signed the same,
giving it to his agent, Milt Gordon, for transportation to
Respondents plant in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 169, 1. 15-16).
At no time did Mr. Morris communicate to Respondent that
there were any conditions attached to his personal guaranty, such
as the signature of Mr. Birkinshaw being necessary (R. 169, 1.
22-25).
During the years 1971 (R. 132, 1. 25-30 and R. 133, 1. 1-12)
and 1972 (R. 167, 1. 12-13) Mr. Morris would come to the State of
Utah on business connected with Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's
Royal Dutch Cookies on the average of twice a year.

Mr. Milt

Gordon was Mr. Morris's agent within the State of Utah and was
looking out for Morris Morris's investment in Hawkeye Investment

-4(R. 147, 1. 23-29, R. 154, 1. 17 and R. 168, 1.14-30). In
addition he would call Mr. Gordon in Salt Lake City at least
once a week (R. 167, 1. 17-18, R. 169, 1. 1-10).

These calls

concerned the business with which Respondent was dealing in
supplying the cookie packages (R. 169, 1. 1-2). This is the
same business, to wit: Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's Royal
Dutch Cookies, which failed to pay the amounts due and owing to
Respondent, causing Respondent to institute this action on
Appellant's personal guaranty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE APPELLANT HAD
SUBMITTED HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
Immediately after plaintiff commenced this action,
defendant made a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction.

In support of this motion the

appellant submitted the affidavit of William W. Morris (R. 11)
and the respondent submitted the affidavits of Al Ellison (R. 12)
and Raymond E. Casaday (R. 17). A hearing was held before the
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, on or about the 8th day of October, 1974.

At that time

the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 22). Thereafter, at the time of trial, the appellant renewed their motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R. 162). The Third Judicial

-5District Court, by and through the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson
Sr., declined to entertain the motion in light of recent decisions
of this Honorable Court which have held to the effect that where
one District Judge has entered an order another District Judge is
not in a position to vacate such order.

Petersen v. Petersen

(1974) 530 P.2d 821; In Re Estate of Mecham (1975) 537 P.2d 312.
Judge Hanson took the entire matter of the trial under
advisement, and on the 16th day of October, 1975, rendered a
Memorandum Decision (R. 52-53).

The Judge stated:

"Another division of this court has already
passed upon the question of whether or not there was
sufficient minimal contact in Utah to give the
plaintiff jurisdiction under the long-arm statute
and found that this court did have jurisdiction, and
it would appear from the evidence which developed
during the trial that there was sufficient minimal
contact to confer jurisdiction upon this court under
the long-arm statute." (Emphasis added)
The Appellant, William Morris, came to the State of Utah
as a large stockholder of Hawkeye Investment Company and acquired
for Hawkeye Investment Company the assets of Bakker's Royal Dutch
Cookies.

This was an operating business located in Draper, Utah.

The company then became known as Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's
Royal Dutch Cookies.

It transacted business with Respondent,

Packaging Corporation of America, all of which business was
transacted within the State of Utah.
This writer would submit that Appellant has not claimed
that any of the business was transacted any place but in the

-6State of Utah.

This business was between Hawkeye and Packaging

Corporation of America.

No claim could be made that if

Respondent was suing Hawkeye Investment, a Nevada corporation,
that the courts of the State of Utah would not have jurisdiction
over Hawkeye because Hawkeye would have fulfilled every one of
the criteria set forth in Hill v. Zale Corporation (1971) 25 U.2d
357, 482 P.2d 332, where the court, at page 334, said as follows:
"1.
or outlets;

Whether there are local offices, stores

2. The presence of personnel, how hired, fired
and paid; the degree of control and the nature of their
duties;
3. The manner of holding out to the public by
way of advertising, telephone listings, catalogs, etc.;
4. The presence of its property, real or
personal, or interest therein, including inventories,
bank accounts, etc.;
5. Whether the activities are sporadic or
transitory as compared to continuous and systematic;
6. The extent to which the alleged facts of
the asserted claim arose from activities within the
state;
7. The relative hardship or convenience to the
parties in being 'required to litigate the controversy
in the state or elsewhere."
What we have in this case is a situation where the
principal stockholder in a business which is clearly operating
within the State of Utah and is doing business with persons and
other businesses within the State of Utah, comes in the State

-7during this period of time on at least four occasions to see how
his business is proceeding, he calls his agent, Milt Gordon,
within the State of Utah once a week for two years to see how
his business is progressing, and induces Respondent to do
business with his business by giving his personal guaranty.
Clearly, all statutory, constitutional and case law
requirements have been met with regards to the actions of the
Appellant within the State of UtahAnnotated, 1953

See: 78-27-24 Utah Code

(as amended, L. 1969, Ch 246 §3); International

Shoe Co, v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct 154, 90 L.ed 95;
and Foreign Study League v. Holland American Line, 27 U.2d 442,
497 P.2d 244 (1972).
The only way Appellant can prevail on his claim of lack
of jurisdiction is if this Court is prepared to say that the
$20,000.00 guaranty must have been executed by the Appellant
solely within the boundaries of the State of Utah.
In accepting Appellant's position, this Court would have
to conclude that a person could come within the State of Utah
and arrange numerous business transactions, all of which affect
the people and businesses of Utah; he could have his business
Doerate solely within the State of Utah, using his name as a
business name; and that so long as the document which gave him
ownersnip of the business was signed by him outside the State of
Utah it would matter not that this business was daily making

-8purchases from other businesses within the State of Utah and
not paying for them.
This, we submit, is clearly not what the Legislature
intended when they enacted the jurisdiction over "Non-Residence
Act" inasmuch as they specifically stated:
". . .that the public interest demands the state
provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against nonresident persons, who through
certain significant minimal contacts with this
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to
the state's protection. . ." (78-27-22 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, L. 1969, Ch 246 §1)
It is further submitted by Respondent that it is not
necessary under our Long-Arm Statutes for the Appellant to have
personally been within the State of Utah each and every time
any business was transacted.

The testimony is clear from Mr.

Morris's own statements (R. 168, 1. 30-30) that Mr. Morris was
doing business in the State of Utah through his agent, Milt
Gordon.
Utah Code Annotated, 78-27-23 (2) reads as follows:
"(2) The words 'transaction of business
within this state' mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives
in this state which affect persons or
businesses within the state of Utah."
(Emphasis
added)
This, we submit, is sufficient to sustain the findings of both
Judge Hall and Judge Hanson, Sr. that Appellant was doing
business within the state of Utah.

-9In his brief Appellant relies upon the following cases,
which for the reasons hereinafter set forth are not applicable
nor controlling in this matter:
(1)

Mack Financial Corp. v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc.

529 P.2d 429.

There is no claim made by respondent in this

matter that the highway within the state of Utah were used by
the appellant in order to obtain long-arm jurisdiction.

The

business transacted in that case was solely done in the state of
Colorado, and the only contact with the state of Utah was when
an officer from Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. came to the state of
Utah to request consent to assign the contracts to a business
entity in Idaho.

In the instant case we had Mr. Morris in the

state of Utah at least twice a year in 1971 and 1972, plus he
had his agent, Milt Gordon, within the state at most times and
made calls to him at least once a week.

In addition there were

several times that Mr. Gordon was in the state of Utah and met
and talked with employees and agents of Respondent.
(2)

Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan,526 P.2d 1186.

This case clearly is not applicable in that the only business
transacted in the state of Utah by defendant was the purchase of
one policy of insurance, and this policy of insurance was initiated
through an agent in the state of Idaho.

For the reasons set forth

in No. (1) above, this case is not applicable.

-10(3)

Kocha v. Gibson Products Co. 535 P.2d 680.

In this

case there were uncontroverted facts that the Universal Carrier
Co. did business principally in the state of Texas, had not been
authorized to do business in the state of Utah, and did not sell
any of its products to any business in the state of Utah.

The

court found that there were absolutely no facts upon which
jurisdiction could be maintained.
No.

For the reasons set forth in

(1) above, this case is inapplicable.
(4)

Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc.

494 P.2d 532, 27 U.2d 233.

This case was a tort case where the

conversion took place in the state of Oregon, and the only
contact within the state of Utah was the allegation of damages
to plaintiff within the state of Utah and the fact that the
purchase price was payable at Salt Lake City, Utah.

This case

clearly is not applicable in that it does not address itself to
the question of the numerous contacts in the state of Utah which
the record in this case showed.
(5)

Conn v. Whitmore, 9 U.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871.

This

case is not applicable because we do not have the question of an
out-of-state buyer taking the initiative.

We have in this case

an in-state supplier taking the initiative and the damage was
done to a citizen within the state of Utah, to wit: Respondent,
who is qualified to do business in the state of Utah and does in
fact transaction business in the state of Utah and is entitled

-11to the protection of the Utah Courts.
In addition to the cases cited by Appellant in his brief
on this point, there are some recent Utah Supreme Court decisions
which should be distinguished at this point.

The first one

being the case of Cate Rental Co., Inc. v. Whalen & Co. 549 P.2d
707 (Utah, 1976) in which case the Court found that the defendant's
president had been in Salt Lake City to discuss business dealings
on only one occasion and that there had been perhaps five phone
calls each year during which the parties had transacted business.
In the instant case there were at least two times in each of the
years the business was transacted between the parties that
Appellant was within the state of Utah, he was constantly present
in the state of Utah through his agent, Milt Gordon, and in
addition made phone calls once a week for approximately two years.
Secondly, Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp. 548 P.2d 1257
(Utah, 1976) wherein there were two times that the general manager
of Union Plastics Corp. came within the state of Utah and had
meetings.

The rest of the negotiations with the parties and the

consummation of the contract took place outside the state of
Jtah.

This case is distinguishable because of the numerous

teieonone calls by appellant to check on his business within
:ne state of Utah and his constant presence within the state of
r

Jtah bv and through is agent, Milt Gordon.

(78-27-23(2), Utah

:ode Annotated, 1953, as amended, L. 1969, Ch. 246, § 2 ) .

-12It is respectfully submitted by Respondent that the
presence of Appellant within the state of Utah during the time in
question has been clearly demonstrated by the record.

That the

activities which gave rise to the claim against Appellant were
continuous and systematic, and that they were activities which
occurred within the state of Utah, to wit: the transaction of the
cookie business, and thus it is more fair and logical that
jurisdiction be found in this state.
It is further submitted by the Respondent that the
Appellant has not shown in his brief the incorrectness of the
rulings of the Third Judicial District Court.In the case of
Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp. supra, at page 1259, this
court said as follows:
''. . .Second,
of verity and
determination
plaintiff has

on appeal we indulge the presumption
correctness of the trial court's
and do not distrub it unless the
shown that it was in error."

It is thus incumbent upon the Appellant to not engage in generalities but to show specifically wherein the lower court erred.
POINT II
THE GUARANTY WAS COMPLETE AND WAS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST
APPELLANT.
It is a fortiori that whenever there is a vague, ambiguous

-13or unclear document, such document should be construed against
the party who was responsible for the drafting of this document.
General Appliance Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 U.2d 238, 516 P.2d 346
(1973) .
However, a reading of the guaranty, which is the subject
matter of this suit (R-3) clearly shows that this document is not
ambiguous on its face.

It would make no difference in this

matter whether Mr. Birkinshaw had or had not signed the document.
The document in its opening paragraphs reads, in part, as
follows:
". . .and in consideration thereof, and of the
benefits to accrue to each of us therefrom, each
of us is a primary obligor severally and jointly
and unconditionally guarantees to you. . ."
(Emphasis added)
It is respectfully submitted that the document in
question is not vague, ambiguous or uncertain by its terms.
Respondent has no argument with Appellant's statement
that it is well settled law that a guaranty containing the
conditional signature of one proposed guarantor subject to the
additional signature of another party is not valid without the
subsequent signature of the other parties.

State Bank v.

Burton Gardner, 14 U. 420, 48 P. 402 (1897)
The important matter which appellant has overlooked is
that where conditions are made as between persons that one will
not be bound unless the other has likewise signed the guaranty,
this condition must be communicated to all of the parties involved.

-14In this particular case Mr. Morris, the Appellant, testified that
he at no time communicated this condition to anyone at Packaging
Corporation of America.

His testimony is as follows:

"Q Now, you have made some allegations to the effect
that this guaranty is conditioned upon Mr. Birkinshaw
signing it, as being jointly liable with you, is that
correct?
A That same condition is attached to the first
$10,000.00 one.
Q Now, did you ever communicate that condition to
anyone who is an officer, agent, or employee of the
Packaging Corporation of America?
A

Not to my knowledge.

Q

To whom did you communicate that condition?

A

To Mr. Birkinshaw and to Mr. Gordon." (R-169, 1. 17-27)

It is well settled in the law that if you seek to have
conditions placed upon your guaranty you must communicate these
conditions to the creditor.

Farmers & Stockgrowers' Bank v.

Pahvant Valley Land Co., 50 U. 35, 165 P. 462 (1917);First
National Bank in Grand Junction v. Osborne, 28 U.2d 387, 503 P.2d
440 (1972); Financial Corporation of America v. Prudential Carbon
& Ribbon Co. , 29 U.2d 23*8, 507 P.2d 1026 (1973); and State Bank
of Utah v. Burton Gardner, supra, where at page 403 of 48 P. the
Court approved the following part of the instruction:
". . .unless you find that the plaintiff had actual
notice that the defendants who signed the guaranty
signed it with the condition precedent to their
liability thereon that all the directors should
endorse on a note and sign the contract of guaranty;
and also in the event of any director not signing
that none of those who signed would be liable."

-15Th is position has been approved by this Court as aforesaid and
by many of our sister states.

J. L. Watkins Co. v. Brund, 294

P.2d 1024 (1931, Wash); Spencer Oil Co. v. Welborn, 20 N.C.App.
681, 212 S.E.2d 618 (1974); Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Foster,
(Minn, 1936) 264 N.W. 570; Livestock Nat. Bank of South Omaha
v. Marshall, (Neb, 1936) 267 N.W. 414; and McClmtock v. Ayers,
(Wyo, 1927) 253 P. 658
Respondent at no time relied on the signing of Mr.
Birkinshaw.

They were interested only in having Mr. Morris

sign the guaranty before advancing additional credit (R-91).
POINT III
THE SUBJECT GUARANTY WAS SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION.
It appears from the evidence adduced at the time of
trial that during the latter part of 1971 and the early part of
197 2, Hawkeye Investment d/b/a Bakker's Royal Dutch Cookies
had placed orders with Respondent that would have increased their
indebtedness beyond the original guaranty signed by Appellant in
the sum of $10,000.00, and in fact this indebtedness did exceed
the $10,000.00 by virtue of several insufficient funds checks
that were returned by the bank and which amounts were charged
back to the account of Hawkeye Investment (Exhibits 7P, 8P and
9P; R-lll, 1. 9-21)
It was during this period of time that contract was
made with the Appellant to increase his personal guaranty to

-16the $20,000.00 figure (R-95, 1. 21-26).

It took a period of

approximately sixty days before Mr. Morris, the Appellant, had
agreed to execute the new guaranty, and the guaranty was not
delivered to the Respondent until February of 197 2.

According

to the testimony and Exhibits 2P and 3P, orders had been
placed during this period of time but had not been manufactured
and shipped to Hawkeye Investment, which orders when manufactured
and shipped were billed according to their order date, and thus
it would appear that perhaps the amount owed to Respondent
exceeded the $10,000.00. However, this is not the situation,
because of the return checks and because of the orders that had
not been processed and billed until a later date.

The testimony

of Mr. Remley and Mr. Ellison clearly show that upon the receipt
of the orders from Hawkeye Investment, that appeared to exceed
the $10,000.00 guaranty limit, they immediately started negotiations with Appellant in an attempt to get the $20,000.00 guaranty
executed (R-146 and 147).
The case of Armstrong v. Cache Valley Land & Canal Co.
14 U. 450, 48 P. 690 (1897) appears to stand for the proposition
that if the defendants receive no benefit from the guaranty then
there was no consideration.

However, in the instant case the

Appellant was a large stockholder in Hawkeye Investment Company,
he was concerned with the cookie plant operating and having the
necessary packaging to market its products, and in order to

-17accomplish this it was necessary for Hawkeye Investment to
acquire the packaging from the Respondent.

This was understood

and accepted by the Appellant before he executed the guaranty
for $20,000.00.

In his testimony (R-163, 1. 18024) he said as

follows:
.". . .1 am not sure whether it was a phone
conversation, or several conversations, but it
was on the basis that the $10,000.00 line of
credit that Mr. Birkinshaw and I had previously
guaranteed had been stood up, and in order to
get anything over $10,000.00 we were going to
have to execute another guaranty in the amount
of $20,000.00."
The guaranty itself (R-3) recites consideration being received
by the Appellant, and further states:
". . .and of benefits to accrue to each of us
therefrom, . . . "
The guaranty on its face is a valid guaranty, it is an absolute
guaranty and is fully enforceable against the Appellant.

Brown

v. Merit, 97 U. 65, 89 P.2d 478 (1939); and Hallstrom v. Buhlar,
14 U.2d 111, 378 P.2d 355 (1963).
Appellant would have this Court now believe that he
received no benefit from the execution of the $20,000.00 guaranty.
There is no testimony that he received no benefit, and in fact
his own testimony as set forth hereinabove would lead this writer
to conclude that he got exactly the benefit that he expected, to
wit: that Packaging Corporation would only allow Hawkeye
Investment's indebtedness to exceed $10,000.00 if he executed
the $20,000.00 guaranty, which he did.

-18CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court
properly concluded that the Appellant had submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts by engaging in business
within the State of Utah and by maintaing an agent in this State
with whom he had weekly contact during the time period involving
the transactions between Appellant and Respondent.
The Trial Court further correctly found valid
consideration for the guaranty, and that the guaranty was clear
and unambiguous and the alleged condition precedent attached
to the guaranty by the Appellant was not properly communicated
to the Respondent, and the Appellant is therefore bound by his
guaranty and Respondent respectfully submits that this Court
should affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Respectfully submitted,
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Attorney for Respondent

